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PROGRESS OF THE LAW.
As MARKED BY DECISIONS SELECTED FROM THE ADVANCE
REPORTS.
ANIMALS.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey holds in. Einnons
et al. v. Stevane et al., 64 Atl. 1014, that the owner of a
Liabilitytor dog is not liable for injuries inflicted by it
injuries upon a person who had cared for it for nearly
four months, where the owner's knowledge of the dog's
viciousness was limited to its propensity to attack
strangers.
BANKRUPTCY.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Second
Circuit, decides in Richardson v. Shaw et al.,- 147 Fed.
Preferences: 659, that where a broker buys stock for a
Stock Broker customer on a margin, the title to such stock
is in the customer and not in the broker, who holds the
same merely as pledgee to secure the advances made by
him in the purchase. Hence the customer is not a cred-
itor of the broker with respect to the transaction within
the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and its sup-
plements, and the transfer of the stock to the customer
on settlement of his account cannot be considered -the
giving of a preference by the broker upon his bankruptcy
within four months thereafter. Compare also the very
recent case In re. Boiling, 147 Fed. 786.
A very gratifying decision appears In re Lloyd et al.,
148 Federal 92, where the United States District Court,
Election of E. D. Wisconsin, decides that the giving out
Truste: Vote of a list of creditors by a bankrupt to attor-
neys before the filing of his schedule is a practice to be
severely condemned, and no attorney should be permitted
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to vote any claim in the election of a trustee which -has
come to him through the instrumentality of the bank-
rupt; but the fact that he so received claims is not suffi-
cient ground for excluding his vote on claims which came
to him unsolicited. Compare In re McGill, xo6 Fed. 57.
The United States District Court, D. Maine, decides
in Moody v. Cole, 138 Fed. 295, that a proceeding in
Conte pt: bankruptcy to enforce obedience to an order
Mn1sur requiring a bankrupt to surrender propertyof Proof or money to his trustee is criminal in charac-
ter, and a finding that the bankrupt is in contempt
should be reached only on evidence which induces belief
beyond a reasonable doubt; but where it meets such
requirement, the court should exercise the power of com-
mitment expressly given by the statute and not compel
the trustee to resort to a plenary suit.
BANKS AND BANKING.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania decides in Clark
&" Co. v. Savings Bank, 31 Pa. Super. Ct. 647, that the
Checks: act of a bank in paying a check on a forged
Acceptances indorsement and its subsequent act of charg-
ing the check against the account of the drawer, is not
an acceptance in writing signed by the acceptor within
the meaning of the Act of May 1o, 188x, P. L. x7, which
declares "that no person within this state shall be charged
as an acceptor on a bill of exchange, draft, or order
drawn for the payment of money, exceeding twenty dol-
lars, unless his acceptance shall be in writing, signed by
himself or his lawful agent." Compare Seventh National
Bank v. Cook, 73 Pa. 483.
In Iowa State Bank v. Cereal Refund & Brokerage Co.,
1o9 N. W., 719, it appeared that defendant, the secre-
inadvertent tary and manager of a corporation, drew aPawecnt check in the name. of the corporation, paya-
of Check ble to himself, on plaintiff bank, with knowl-
edge that the corporation had no funds on deposit. He
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deposited the check with another bank, which presented
it for payment. Payment was twice refused, and defen-
dant was notified thereof. The check was presented a
third time, when plaintiff inadvertently paid it and de-
fendant received the money thereon. Under these facts
the Supreme Court of Iowa decides that the plaintiff
was entitled to recover the money from defendant. as
having been paid by mistake. See in this connection
Bank v. Bank, 74 Fed. 276.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decides in Com-
monwealth ex rel. v. State Bank of Pittsburg, 216 Pa. 124,
Sepration that where a creditor draws upon a debtor
of Funds, and sends the draft for collection to a bank in
which the debtor is a depositor, and the bank with the
depositor's consent issues a draft to the creditor on a
bank in another city, and charges the amount of the
draft against the depositor's account and it appears that
before such change was made the money was remitted
to pay the draft, the creditor cannot claim, after the
failure of the first bank, that the money sent to the sec-
ond bank, was so separated from the general funds of
the first bank that it should be applied to the payment
of his draft. Compare State v. Bank of Commerce, 6r
Neb. x8x.
BREACH OF MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
A somewhat remarkable decision of the Supreme
Court of Washington appears in Grover v. Zook, 87 Pac.
Defences: 638, where it is held that on grounds of public,I Heal policy a man is not liable for breach of a mar-
riage promise where the woman was suffering from pul-
monary tuberculosis, although he knew that she had the
disease at the time of the engagement. The agitation
in certain quarters for legislation in regard to qualifica-
tions for marriage renders this decision of special interest.
Compare Shackleford v. Hamilton, 39 Ky. 8o, x5 L. R.
A. 531.
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CARRIERS.
The Supreme Court of Iowa holds in Pennsylvania
Company v. Shearer, 79 N. E. 431, that a common car-
Limiting rier and a shipper may, in the absence of
Liability fraud, imposition, or deception, enter into a
valid and enforceable special agreement requiring the
shipper, in case of loss or damage, to make verified claim
for damages in writing, within a specified time, and, in
default thereof, that the carrier shall not be liable, pro-
vided that the period of time within which such claim
shall be made is, under all the circumstances of each case,
a reasonable one. Compare Pittsburgh etc. Rd. Co. v.
Sheppard, 56 Ohio St. 68.
In Green v. Missouri, etc. Ry. Co., 97 S. W. 646, the
Kansas City Court of Appeals of Missouri decides that
Liability the fact that a passenger is riding on a freight
or Delay train does not relieve the carrier from liability
for injuries to him owing to negligent delay in transpor-
tation. Compare Whitehead v. Railway Co., 99 Mo. 263,
6 L. R. A. 4o9.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
It is decided by the Supreme Court of Mississippi in
Bradford Construction Company v. Heflin, 42 So. 174,
that a partial abrogation of the fellow-servantEqa Protec-.
tion of the law as to "railroad corporations" which ex-
Law cludes railroads operated as an adjunct to
the main business of the corporation, rather than as com-
mon carriers, is not obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution of the United States. Compare
Beeson v. Busenbark, 44 Kan. 673, io L. R. A. 839.
CONTEMPT.
The United States District Court, D. Montana, decides
in United States v. Carroll, 147 Fed. 947, that a direct
Act In VicinItY attempt by a person to bribe or persuade a
of Court witness to testify contrary to the truth in a
cause pending and then on trial, or to influence the jury
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or any member thereof to find a verdict in favor of one
party or the other, made on the street in the immediate
vicinity of the court, constitutes a direct contempt, and
the mere denial of the charge by the accused under oath
is not sufficient to exonerate him, but the matter should
be heard and determined upon all the testimony produced.
CONTRACTS.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska in Grochowski v.
Grochowski et al., io9 N. W. 742, that a promise made
Public in consideration of an agreement to refrain
Policy from resisting the probate of a will is not
void as against public policy where no persons or interests
other than the persons and interests of the contracting
parties are prejudicially affected thereby.
An interesting decision presenting a very novel rule
appears in Klug v. Sheriffs, 1o9 N. W. 656, where it is
use of decided by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
Portrait that where defendant left two photographs
of his deceased wife with an artist to aid him in painting
a portrait of her, and the artist after completing the por-
trait painted a second one without the authority or con-
sent of defendant this constituted a breach of implied
contract to use the photographs only for the purpose for
which they were furnished, so that defendant, though
receiving the second portrait, and refusing to return it
to the artist, was not liable to the artist for its value.
One judge dissents. Compare Pavesich v. New England
L. Ins. Co., 50 S. E. 69, and Schulman v. Whitaker, 42
So. 227, cited infra. "
CORPORATIONS.
In Dunbar et al. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co. et al. 79 N. E. 423, it appeared that minority stock-
holders in a suit to restrain another corpora-
Purchase' tion from purchasing the majority of the
Stock of
competin stock in their company alleged that the pur-
Company,
pose of the trade was to stifle competition;
that such purchasing company intended to acquire stock,
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and through such ownership to select directors, who should
act in the interest of the purchasing company and free it
from competition, and that its ultimate purpose was
to destroy finally the complainants' company. Under
these facts the Supreme Court of Illinois holds that such
conduct of the purchasing company was fraudulent as
against such minority stockholders, entitling them to
maintain their suit for release. The case is a very excel-
lent review of the authorities. Compare Wheeler v. Pull-
inan Iron & Steel Co., 143 Ill. 197.
The United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York,
decides in Bowker v. Haight & Freese Co., 147 Fed. 923,
insolvency that a federal court which is in charge of the
Proceeaings assets of an insolvent corporation by its re-
ceivers will not interfere with an action in a state court
in which a judgment hs been rendered against the cor-
poration by directing it not to appeal therefrom, where
such appeal will not involve expense to the estate.
CRIMINAL LAW.
The Supreme Court of Ohio decides in State v. Hens-
ley, 79 N. E. 462, that an order made by the Court of
Trial: Common Pleas during the trial of an indict-
Exclusion ot ment for a felony, to the effect that in view
Public of the testimony expected to be given by wit-
nesses next to be called the court would continue the
trial during the taking of the testimony of witnesses
likely to give immoral or obscene testimony in the small
courtroom, that the sheriff should admit no one to said
room except the jury, defendant's counsel, and members
of the bar and newspaper men and one other person, a
witness for defendant, exceeds the power of the court in
the premises, and its enforcement is a denial to defendant
of his constitutional right to a public trial. Compare
Grimrnett v. State 22 Tex. App. 36.
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A very interesting decision with respect to the right
of the State to take photographs of persons accused of
Photogrph crime appears in Schulman v. Whitaker, 42
fhAtccused So. 227, where it is held by the Supreme
Court of Louisiana that unless it be evident that a pic-
ture should be taken to identify the person or to detect
crime, it cannot be taken; the purpose not being detec-
tion' or identification. If a person is under arrest or
within the court's jurisdiction, generally there arises no
necessity for the exercise of the photographer's art before
his trial and conviction. Compare also the case immedi-
ately following of Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 42 So. 228. The
importance of the decisions is obvious.
In State v. Bursaw, 87 Pac. 183, the'Supreme Court of
Kansas holds that when an accused becomes a witness
Accused as in his own behalf it is not error for the court
Witness to call attention to his testimony and to ad-
vise the jury that it may consider his interest in the result
of the trial as affecting his credibility.
DAMAGES.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota decides in Lindh v..
Great Northern Ry. Co., io9 N. W. 823, that an action
Mental ex delicto to recover damages for injured
Anguist feelings lies at the suit of the husband against
a common carrier for soiling and ruining the casket con-
taining the body of his dead wife, and for mutilating
and disfiguring the corpse by negligently and wilfully
exposing it to rain.
In Rhind v. Freedley et al., 64 Atl. 963, the Supreme
Court of New Jersey holds that where a vendor fails to
deliver goods in accordance with his contract,
and they cannot be procured in .the market,
and the vendee is obliged to procure other goods, the
measure of damages is the difference between the contract
price and the price of the nearest substitute procurable.
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See in this connection Hinde v. Liddell, L. R. zo Q. B.
265.
In Pittsburg &fc. R. Co. v. Wakefield Hardware Co., 55
S. E. 422, the Supreme Court of North Carolina decides
Wron, that where cars are wrongfully attached, evi-
Attacment dence of profits which the owner might have
made during the period of their detention from hiring
them out, as was its custom, may not be shown, as this
would be speculative damages, but the true measure of
damages is the interest on their value, increased or di-
minished, as the case may be, by the difference between
their deterioration if in daily use, and their deterioration
while wrongfully tied up, provided the owner was not
able to avoid all injury from the attachment by simply
giving bond. Compare Sharpe v. Railroad, 13o N. C. 614.
DIVORCE.
An important decision occurs in Mutter v. Mutter, 97
S. W. 393, where it appeared that a husband sought a
Physal,, divorce in the ground of the wife's malforma-
I.pac'ty tion, preventing sexual intercourse. The evi-
dence showed that they lived together but three days;
that the wife was not a normally formed woman; that
it was impossible for her to have sexual intercourse; that
she knew the facts before her marriage, but concealed
them from the husband until after marriage. Under
these facts the Court of Appeals of Kentucky decides
that the husband was entitled to a divorce though sur-
gery might remove the malformation.
FEDERAL COURTS.
In Gaddie v. Mann et al., 147 Fed. 960, the United
States Circuit Court, S. D. Georgia, W. D., decides that
where one partner has committed acts which
Jurisdiction render the continuation of the partnership
impossible, all of the other partners are not requirid to
join as complainants in a suit for dissolution; but such
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suit may be maintained by one joining the others as de-
fendants, and the fact that the interest of others may
be similar to his own, and that they are citizens of the
same state as the offending partner, will not defeat the
jurisdiction of a federal court, where the complainant
is a citizen of another State. See in this connection notes
to Shipp v. Williams, io C. C. A. 249, and to Mason v.
Dullagham, 27 C. C. A. 298.
IMPROVEMENTS.
In Collins v. Taylor, 64 Atl. 946, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine decides that when one builds a house upon
the land of another, with the consent of the
Landof landowner, or the landowner subsequently
Another assents to its remaining there as the prop-
erty of the builder, in either event the house is the
personal property of the builder. Compare Fuller v.
Tabor, 39 Me. z9.
INJUNCTION.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina decides in Singer
Mfg. Co. v. Sunners etdal., 65 S. E. 522, that where an
Protection agent deposited the principal's money in a
Pending bank, and with intent to embezzle it obtained
Litgatin a cashier's check in his own name and indorsed
it to a third person, the agent being insolvent, and the
third person a nonresident, in an action by the principal
against the bank, and the other parties to the check to
recover the deposit, it was proper to restrain payment
of the check until the rights of the parties could be deter-
mined. Herewith compare Edwards v. Culberson, -i ii
N. C. 342, 18 L. R. A. 204.
INSURANCE.
In Haldeman v. Dublin Mutual Insurance and Pro-
tective Co., 6 Dis. R. 6x, the Pennsylvania Common
Pleas Court of Bucks County decides that
1.ubrogation:
inCiec where property insured is destroyed bythe
Netlgence negligence of a third person, so that the in-
sured has a remedy against him, the insurer, by the pay-
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ment of the loss, becomes subrogated to the rights of the
assured to the extent of the sum paid on the policy. A
settlement between the assured and the wrongdoer, re-
leasing the latter from all liability, destroys the insurer's
right to subrogation and thereby discharges him from
liability. See in this connection Packham v. German
Fire Insuranre Co., 91 Md. 515, 5o L. R. A.
JUDGMENTS.
The United States Circuit Court of Appeals, First Cir-
cuit, decides in Coram et al. v. Ingersoll, 148 Fed. z69,
Res that where an ancillary administrator brings
Judicta an action on a chose in action properly deemed
assets of the estate in his jurisdiction, and a judgment
is rendered against him on the merits, such judgment is
conclusive in favor of the defendants everywhere, and a
second suit cannot be maintained against them on the
same cause of action by an ancillary administrator of
the estate in another jurisdiction. The case is a very
thorough review of the question involved. Compare the
decision below in Ingersoll v. Coram, 136 Fed. 639, where
the contrary view was taken.
LIENS.
The Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 2, decides
in Reardon v. Higgins, 79 N. E. 208, that the advance-
Equitable ment of money by defendant to plaintiff with
Lien an agreement that plaintiff's horse would be
security therefor, and should be delivered -to defendant
to hold such security, and to sell if the money was not
paid in a reasonable time, gives an equitable lien. The
court further holds that an equitable lien based on an
agreement to give one possession of a horse as security
for money advanced is a good counterclaim in replevin.
for the horse, though replevin sounds in tort. Compare
Lapham v. Osborne, 2o Nev. x68.
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MARRIAGE.
Since the passage by the Pennsylvania Legislature of
the act of June 24, rgoI, Pamphlet Laws, 597, prohibit-
Fist ing the marriage of first cousins, it has been
Cousins a mooted question as to whether if such a
marriage is celebrated outside the state between citi-
zens of Pennsylvania the marriage will be recognized
within the state. In Commonwealth v. Isaacmann, x6
Dis. Rep. x8, the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadel-
phia County dealing with this question holds that such
a marriage will be recognized where the parties in cele-
brating the marriage outside the state do not appear to
have intended to evade the provisions of the Act. What
the result would be in case there has been an effort to
evade the statutory enactment is not decided, but it is
believed that in view of the peculiar language of the Act
the same result would be reached.
MASTER AND SERVANT.
The Supreme Court of Kansas decides in Atchison &5fc.
Ry. Co. v. Fronk, 87 Pa. 698, that a student brakeman,
Railroad who, in consideration of being permitted to
employees ride on a railway company's freight train to.
observe and learn the duties of a freight brakeman, agrees
to perform service on its engines, trains, and cars, while
learning such duties, is an employe of the company.
Compare Huntzicker v. Illinois C. R.R. Co., 129 Fed. 548.
A very interesting decision in relation to the fellow-
servant rule occurs in Ricker v. Central R. Co. of New
Fellow Jersey, 64 Atl. zo68, where it is held that a
Servants train despatcher of a railroad company,
whose duty it is to issue telegraphic orders for the move-
ment of trains upon a single-tracked road, in the name
of the superintendent, and to see that they are trans-
mitted, is not a fellow servant of a fireman upon one of
the locomotives of the company. Seven judges dissent.
Compare Belleville Stone Co. v. Mooney, 61 N. J. Law
253, 39 L. R. A. 834.
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MONOPOLIES.
In Mines v. Scribner et al., 147 Fed. 927, it is decided
by the United States Circuit Court, S. D. New York,
Restraint that an agreement by the members of a pub-
of Trade lishers' association controlling ninety per cent.
of the book business of the country, under which all
agreed not to sell to anyone who would cut prices on
copyrighted books, nor to anyone who should be known
to have sold to others who cut prices, etc., was an agree-
ment relating to interstate trade or commerce within the
Anti-trust Act.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.
The Supreme Court of Mississippi decides in Mayor
etc. of Vicksburg v. Richardson, 42 So. 234, that a city
Sewerage: which after notice does not prevent connection
Liability of private sewerage with its gutters along
the sides of streets, whereby the offal is carried to a va-
cant lot, creating a nuisance rendering an adjoining
house uninhabitable, is liable for the damage. Compare
Demby v. City of Kingston, 133 N. Y., 538.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey holds in Bye et al.
v. Atlantic City, 64 AtI. xo56, that a municipal council
Public may determine, in the exercise of the discre-
Improvements tion vested in it, to pave a public highway
with a special or patented material, and to ask for bids
upon such material alone, when the price at which any
one may obtain the patented material is definitely fixed
and known to be obtainable by all at such price before
the bids are asked for. See also Newark v. Bonnell, 57
N. J. Law 424.
NEGLIGENCE.
An important principle is laid down by the Common
Pleas Court No. 2 of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania,
Contributory in Weir v. Haverford Electric Light Company,
Neg igence 16 Pa. C. C. R. x, where it is held that when
a defendant by wanton and reckless negligence has
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caused injury to a plaintiff the fact that the plaintiff has
been guilty of mere negligence will not justify the court
in entering a non-suit. Compare Mulherrin v. Railroad
Co., 81 Pa. 366.
RAILROADS.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey de-
cides in Johanson et al. v. Atlantic City R. Co., 64 AtI.
Right of Way: io6i, that where a railway company builds
License its road upon the land of another without
other authority than the parol license of the owner, the
latter may ordinarily revoke such parol license at any
time, and bring suit to recover possession of the premises.
Herewith compare Hetfield v. C. R. R., 29 N. J. 571.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
In Knuth et al. v. Butte Electric Ry. Co. et al., 148 Fed.
73, the United States Circuit Court, D. Montana, decides
Separabl, that an action to recover damages for the
Co.troversy negligent injury of a person while a messenger
on a street car is one ex delicto, and not on the contract
of carriage, and the plaintiff may join as defendants the
street railroad and an employe, where the joint negli-
gence is alleged to have been the cause of the injury;
and in such case the cause of action is not separable for
the purpose of removal. See in this connection notes to
Robbins v. Ellenbogen 18 C.C.A. 86.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
In Kittredge et al. v. Kittredge, 65 AtI. 89, the Supreme
Court of Vermont decides that where, by agreement
Wife vs. between a husband and wife, the wife was to
-Husband convey a portion of her farm to the husband
in consideration of his joining with her in deeding the
remainder to her children, the conveyance having been
made to him, she was entitled to maintain a bill to en-
force specific performance on his part notwithstanding
the marital relation. Compare Pinny v. Fellows, z5 Vt.
525.
